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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 17/05/2006 Accident number: 159 
Accident time: 10:40 Accident Date: 31/12/1998 





Primary cause: Unavoidable (?) Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: 15/01/1999 
ID original source: TL/DL (date inferred) Name of source: CMAC 
Organisation: Name removed  




hidden root mat 
trees 
Date record created: 14/02/2004 Date  last modified: 14/02/2004 
No of victims: 2 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: MF: M2648 Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
victim ill (?) 
inadequate metal-detector (?) 
request for better PPE (?) 
inconsistent statements (?) 
1 
request for clearance with explosive charge (?) 
safety distances ignored (?) 
disciplinary action against victim (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
 
Accident report 
At the time of the accident the demining group operated in a two-man drill whereby one 
deminer used the detector and marked any signals while the other looked for tripwires, cut 
undergrowth and excavated any detector readings. The team member not working was 
intended to “control” the other. 
Accident reports were prepared for the UN supported MAC by two ex-pat Technical Advisors. 
The following is a summary of both reports. 
The demining platoon had been working in the area since July 1998 and had cleared 
18,120m2, finding 450 mines and 177 UXOs before the accident. All the mines had been M16 
and M14s, with the M14s "tending" to be placed in a ring about a metre from M16s.  
The victim's section started work at 07:30. The weather was "sunny, hot and dry". The mined 
area was characterised by having a "heavy laterite" soil that had been "hardened by dry 
weather". The STA reported that the laterite soil was "on occasions" more than the MineLab 
F1A4 detector could "deal with". The vegetation included "young trees, bushes and some 
vines" with a dense root structure to a depth of 5-15cm. The team had found three mines 
before the accident.  
At the time of the accident, Victim No.1 was excavating a detector reading. Victim No.2 was 
the detector man and had paused on his return to the safe area because he felt unwell and so 
had not left the vicinity when the mine initiated. Victim No.1 was excavating with a "trowel" [a 
locally made excavating tool] (after prodding) when (at 10:40) he initiated a mine. He had 
been a deminer for 13 months. 
 
[The picture shows the type of “trowel” used by the victim.] 
After the detonation Victim No.1 was in the safe area "lying on his side and screaming , 'help 
me....my eyes...my hand'." The supervisor saw that "his left eye, chin and right arm were very 
seriously injured". Victim No.2 was also injured but "not much". A witness reported that he 
was standing shouting, "Help, I have been hit on my face". First aid was given by the Platoon 
Commander's deputy and Victim No.1 was carried to the Control Point and a waiting medic 
and ambulance. The ambulance left the site at 10:55, also carrying two deminers with the 
same blood group as Victim No.1. Victim No.2 was not evacuated. 
The investigators examined the working lane and found no metal contamination. They 
checked the detector and found it to be working properly. At the accident site they found a 
small crater (about 30cm diameter and 15cm deep) next to a small tree. The shape of the 
crater was thought to suggest that the blast was angled "slightly" towards the victim. There 
were several torn roots around the crater and one (about 15mm diameter) that cut across the 
crater and had been broken in a manner that implied the mine had been between two roots 
(top and bottom). The growth of tree roots over pressure plates was thought to explain some 
apparently spontaneous detonations reported by locals. 
2 
Close to the accident site were two exposed and marked M14 mines located by the victim. 
The investigators examined the excavations around those mines and found that the victim 
had done the work properly "by forming a ramp as taught". The tools being used by the victim 
were photographed. 
The victim was kneeling and prodding/excavating when the accident occurred. He was 
wearing the demining organisation's protective "goggles" [spectacles]. A photograph of the 
left lens indicated that the spectacles broke up. One investigator described the lens as 
"completely destroyed" and used the same phrase to describe Victim No.1's left eyeball. They 
observed that "some" [presumably a metal fragment] of Victim No.1's excavating tool had 
been recovered from his face (above his eye) and that the rest of the tool-head had plastic 
along the edge. They took this to indicate that it "was blown directly at the glasses of the 
deminer" when the handle separated. [See also the accident that occurred on 17th March 
1998 in Cambodia.] The investigators mentioned that "the detector man was also slightly 
injured on the face. He was eleven metres away when the explosion occurred" and "received 
minor fragmentation injuries". 
The Section Commander gave some of the detail in the above and also stated that the 
Victims were treated by the Platoon Commander, his second in command (2IC) and the 
Section Commander. The stretcher was carried by the Platoon Commander and his 2IC. 
The 2IC said that he carried the stretcher and medical kit to the site of the accident when he 
heard the explosion. He administered first aid for 2-3 minutes then helped carry the victim to 
the "Control point" where the medic was waiting with an ambulance. 
A member of the team working alongside stated that he knew the Victims well and did not 
think they were unwell at the time of the accident. 
Victim No.2 was interviewed shortly after the accident and said he was feeling unwell and 
"scared" [shocked].  He said he had been feeling unwell all that morning, but that he was not 
too sick to work so did not report it. He had felt dizzy after placing the marker that Victim No.1 
was investigating, so he had rested on his way back to the safe lane. He watched his partner 
and saw that he prodded first, then used his trowel to excavate. When the mine went off he 
was hit in the face by "stones" and temporarily blinded because he had taken off his safety 
spectacles to rest. 
Victim No.1 was interviewed by the Senior Technical Advisor on 7th January 1999. He was 
the first person from the demining group to visit the victim following the accident. 
 
Conclusion    
The investigators observed that this was the second accident in the same mined area within 
three months, and that the accidents were similar because both mines were M14s, both 
detonated during excavation, both were close to M16 mines. In both cases the victim was 
aware of the presence of the mine and in both cases the victim lost an eye. [See accident that 
occurred on 5th October 1998 in Cambodia]. 
The investigators concluded that the damage suffered by the deminer proved that safety 
"goggles" [spectacles] did not protect eyes. The position of the mine "bridged" by a root 
meant that the deminer could have been working entirely correctly, and they thought that he 
was. There were contradictory stories over why Victim No.2 was in the vicinity, and the 
investigators offered no opinion over which was true. The Senior Technical Advisor decided 
that Victim No.2 "bears responsibility for his injuries" because he did not withdraw to the safe 
distance required.  
The combination of hard, laterite soil, heavy fragmentation, thick vegetation and a "very high" 
density of mines made this an especially dangerous area. The investigators were satisfied 






The investigators recommended that targets underneath roots should be marked and 
investigated later by using "explosive to clear or soften the soil" before "normal… investigation 
of targets should proceed". They also recommended that the need for extreme caution be 
stressed; that no "pressure for increased productivity" be applied; that protective visors be 
issued "to all deminers involved in prodding/excavation" [full face polycarbonate visors were 
purchased for this purpose by one Technical Advisor and issued to this group only during 
January 1999]; that Victim No.2 and the Section Commander be disciplined for "failing to 
ensure the correct safety distances were applied"; that water should be used as an aid to 
excavation more frequently; that the quality of the metal in the excavation tool be investigated; 
that the use of surface charges to detonate mines in dangerous positions be considered; that 
SOPs for follow-up after an accident be "developed and followed"; and that accident 
investigation procedures should be clarified.  
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 203 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: no 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: 4 hours 15 minutes 
Protection issued: Safety spectacles Protection used: Safety spectacles 
 








See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
First aid was administered by the Platoon 2IC at the accident site and Victim No.1 was 
"stabilised" at the control point. He was evacuated from site by ambulance at 10:55.  
A Memo from the demining group's  manager dated 5th January 1999 stated that Victim No.1 
arrived at Kampong Cham Hospital at 14.55. It listed the injuries of Victim No.1 as: "Left 
eyeball completely; Right forearm in size of approximate 10-12cm x 4cm x 1.5cm depth and 




Victim number: 204 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Safety spectacles Protection used: Safety spectacles 
 





The victim was "slightly injured" by fragmentation to the face and eyes but was not evacuated 
for treatment. No medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as "Unavoidable" because the main victim 
appears to have been working as directed, and in a way that is commonly accepted as 
adequate. He was in breach of SOPs because he was not lying down to excavate, but this 
breach was "normal" for that demining group and his field superiors had approved it. 
There was also a significant failure of management manifested by the issue of inadequate 
safety spectacles - a failure compounded by having gone uncorrected over the life of the 
demining group.  
The failure of the tool demonstrates the importance that should be attached to ensuring that 
hand-tools do not separate in a blast. The tool was long, but not fixed together adequately 
and may not have been made of suitably pliable steel. The secondary cause is listed as 
“Inadequate equipment”. 
There was a further failure of control because the supervisors did not correct Victim No.2's 
failure to maintain safety distances, or ensure that he wore his safety spectacles while still in 
the danger area. 
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